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PATENT TROLLING—WHY BIO & PHARMACEUTICALS
ARE AT RISK
Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II*
Patent trolls—also known variously as non-practicing entities, patent
assertion entities, and patent monetizers—are a top priority on legislative
and regulatory reform agendas. In the modern debates, however, the
biopharmaceutical industry goes conspicuously unmentioned. Although
biopharmaceuticals are paradigmatically centered on patents, conventional
wisdom holds that biopharmaceuticals are largely unthreatened by trolls.
This article shows that the conventional wisdom is wrong, both theoretically
and descriptively. In particular, the article presents a ground-breaking study
of the life science holdings of 5 major universities to determine if these
might be attractive to monetizers.
This was deliberately a light, rather than an exhaustive, search.
Nevertheless, we identified dozens of patents that could be deployed against
current industries. These include patents on active ingredients of drugs;
methods of treatment; screening methods to identify new drugs;
manufacturing methods; dosage forms; and ancillary technologies that
could be deployed in a ―peddler‘s bag‖ approach. The article describes the
types of patents we found, including an example of each type.
In deciding whether to undertake this analysis, we lost sleep over
whether the potential for harm outweighed the potential benefit. If reform
efforts are not undertaken, our work could do no more than provide a handy
road map for those who would follow. However, with scattered anecdotal
evidence suggesting that monetization is moving into biopharmaceuticals,
life sciences trolling is predictable and in its infancy. If reforms are
implemented before the problem proliferates, legislators and regulators
could cabin the activity before it becomes deeply entrenched and too much
harm occurs.
Word count: 16,729 words including footnotes.
*

Robin Feldman is Professor of Law, Harry & Lillian Hastings Chair, and Director of
the Institute for Innovation Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law.
Nicholson Price is an Academic Fellow at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy,
Biotechnology and Bioethics at Harvard Law School. We wish to thank Ben Roin and
Glenn Cohen for helpful comments, and David Pratt of m-Cam Inc. for assistance with
identifying and collecting university patents. We are also grateful for the excellent
research assistance provided by Alex Shank and Timothy Yim. All errors are our own.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395987

2

PATENT TROLLING
PATENT TROLLING: WHY BIO & PHARMACEUTICALS ARE AT RISK
INTRODUCTION

Patent trolling is at the top of legislative and regulatory reform
agendas at many levels. In May of 2013, for example, the White House
released an extensive report on patent assertion, along with a series of
executive orders and recommendations for Congress.1 Members of
Congress were already showing interest in addressing the issue. A variety of
bills have been introduced; the Chairmen of both the House and Senate
Judiciary Committee have introduced bills on litigation reform, with
hearings in the fall of 2013.2 In addition, subcommittees of the Senate
Energy Committee and the House Energy & Commerce Committee have
held hearings on pre-litigation reform. The proposals address different
aspects of a complex problem that will need to be addressed on many levels
across a long period of time.
On the regulatory front, the Federal Trade Commission voted in
September of 2013 to initiate a broad ranging Section 6(b) investigation into
patent assertion entities. Under Section 6(b), the FTC has the power to
conduct wide-ranging economic studies of businesses and practices that
affect commerce.3 The FTC action followed a joint workshop held by the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in December of
2012 on the antitrust implications of patent assertion entities.4 The Patent
and Trademark Office has initiated its own proposals, focused largely on
sunshine rules. The PTO activities follow its own workshop in January of

1

Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; White
House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech
Patent Issues (June 04, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
2
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845,
113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent
Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse Reduction
Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013,
H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013); Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766,
113th Cong. (2013); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation
Integrity Act of 2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013).
3
See generally OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FTC, HISTORY OF SECTION 6 REPORTWRITING AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION(1981) [hereinafter HISTORY OF § 6],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/231984.pdf.
4
Press Release, Dep‘t. of Justice, Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission to
Hold Workship on Patent Assertion Entity Activites (Dec. 7, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/289873.htm.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395987

WHY BIO & PHARMA ARE AT RISK

3

2013, as well as the White House directives.5
Some states have entered the fray as well. Vermont passed
legislation related to patent trolling, and the Vermont Attorney General‘s
Office has initiated actions against entities under that legislation. Nebraska
followed suit with its own actions, and other state legislatures are beginning
to hold hearings.6 Even the Supreme Court has begun to nibble around the
edges of the issue. The Court began the October 2013 term by granting
certiorari in two cases that could have an impact on patent trolling, both
related to awarding attorney‘s fees for baseless or exceptional patent cases
that are rejected by the courts.7
The issue has attracted increasing attention from academics, the
press, and companies in many sectors. Technology companies have led the
way, with active lobbying campaigns in the United States and in Europe as
well.8 This is not surprising, given that modern patent trolling has made a
strong appearance in technology heavy industries, such as software,
5

Comments of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice and
the United States Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Notice of Roundtable on
Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest Information Throughout
Application Pendency and Patent Term, No. PTO-P-2012-0047 (Feb. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201pto-rpi-comment.pdf; see supra note 3.
6
Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act 9 V.S.A. §§ 4195-99 (2013);
Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00170-wks (May 8, 2013);
Letter from Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Nebraska, to M. Brett Johnson, Partner, Farney
Daniels LLP (July 18, 2013) (demanding that law firm ―cease and desist the initiation of
any and all new patent infringement enforcement efforts‖ with respect to patents held by its
non-practicing-entity clients, pending a state investigation), available at
http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyn/files/1069534z3005a836/_fn/071813+Farney+Daniel
s+LLP+-+Cease+%26+Desist+Letter+and+Civil+Investigative+Demand.pdf;
Press
Release, Attorney General Lori Swanson Announces First-in-the-Nation Order to Stop
Delaware Company from ―Patent Trolling‖ in Minnesota (August 20, 2013), available at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/130820StopPatentTrolling.asp; Press
Release, Coakley Discusses Patent Trolling During Tour of Boston Startup LevelUp (Nov.
6,
2013),
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/pressreleases/2013/2013-11-06-patent-trolling.html; Informational Hearing on Patent Assertion
Entities Before the California Assembly Select Committee on High Technology (October
30, 2013) (statement of Prof. Brian J. Love), http://law.scu.edu/wp-content/uploads/BrianLove-Testimony-Cal-Select-Comm-on-High-Tech-Hearing-on-PAEs-10-30-13.pdf.
7
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 Fed. Appx. 57 (Fed. Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1184);
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2013) (No. 12-1163).
8
Letter from adidas, AG, et al. to Member States of the European Union, et al. (Sept.
26,
2013),
available
at
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2NkpoN29UVm11OWc; Letter from the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, et al. to Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
et al. (July 17, 2013).
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smartphones, and computers. Retail companies have joined in as well,
however, with brick and mortar stores like J.C. Penny Co. and adidas AG
asking lawmakers to provide relief, and fighting back in the courts.9
In all of the noise, however, the life sciences industry has been
silent. Conventional wisdom holds that patent trolling is a problem for the
technology sector, not for biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Indeed, in
the debate leading up to the 2011 patent reform legislation known as the
America Invents Act, the life sciences industry opposed reforms to patent
damage calculations, reforms that might have helped curb some of the
patent trolling activity that has exploded in the interim. Thus, any
legislation or regulatory reforms that emerge are likely to be designed to
bypass the life sciences industry.
We believe that the conventional wisdom is shortsighted. These
industries are far more vulnerable to trolling than commonly acknowledged,
and there are early indications that patent trolling is beginning to move into
the life sciences arena. In a sign of things to come, for example, patent
brokers are beginning to hear from pharmaceutical companies who are
looking for monetizers that might be interested in buying their non-core
patents.10 Similarly, two recent studies on patent demands against startup
companies showed patent demands moving into the life sciences industry.11
9

Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and
Potential Solutions, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property & the Internet of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9–112, 136–45, 236–60 (Mark Chandler,
Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Cisco Systems; Janet L. Dhillon, Evexutive
Vice President and General Counsel of J.C. Penny Co.; John G. Boswell, Senior Vice
President and Chief Legal Officer of SAS Institute; and Dana Rao, Vice President and
Associate General Counsel of Adobe Systems testifying before the House Committee on
the need for patent reform in response to abusive patent litigation).
10
Lisa Shuchman, The AIA’s Impact on In-House Patent Processes, Corporate
Counsel (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202641886062 (noting that
intellectual property counsel in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical devices
industries ―are being called upon to monetize and get more value out of their company‘s
IP.‖)
11
Robin Feldman, PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES: THE VIEW FROM THE
VENTURE
CAPITAL
COMMUNITY
2,
36
(2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346338 (finding that 30% of venture
capitalists in sample who have received patent demands have experienced them in the life
sciences sector); Colleen Chien, PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION 11 fig. 1
(2013),
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20
and%20Startup%20Innovation_updated.pdf (finding that 13% of bio/pharma or medical
device venture capitalists in the sample reported receiving NPE demands against their
portfolio companies). See also Jonathan Harris, Diane Ragosa, and Thara Russell, When
NPEs Target the Medical Device Industry, Corporate Counsel (Feb. 4, 2014),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202641437461 (noting the growth of monetizer activity
in the medical devices industry and their relatively high success rate against that industry).
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Most important, as patent monetizers move towards purchasing
portfolios from research universities, the risk to biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies that have existing products on the market
increases exponentially. There is increasing pressure on universities to
monetize their patents by transferring rights to assertion entities. In
particular, the Association of University Technology Managers recently
announced that it was re-examining its policies that had recommended
against transferring rights to non-practicing entities.12 Most important, some
of the proposals would exempt universities and those working with
universities from the reforms that are intended to curb abuses in patent
monetization. It is critical for legislative drafters to understand the potential
for problems within university portfolios in general and life science
portfolios in particular. Without such recognition, patent monetization
entities may be able to form joint ventures with universities or obtain
sufficient exclusive licensing rights to university portfolios that would allow
them to avoid any reforms enacted.13
Our goal in this article is to sound the alarm and to demonstrate the
importance of taking action before the problem proliferates. In order to do
this, we examined the patent portfolios of the 5 research universities that
hold the largest number of patents. Following approaches taken by different
types of monetizers in the technology field, we identified university patents
that could be launched against types of products currently sold by
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. This article describes a
selection of those patents in order to demonstrate the risks that exist.
In deciding whether to undertake this analysis, we lost sleep over the
question of whether the potential for harm from engaging in the analysis
outweighed the potential benefit. As one of the authors has noted in the
12

See Paul Baskin, Under Financial Pressure, Universities Give Patent Buyers a
Closer Look, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Oct 25, 2013); see also Heidi Ledford,
Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, NATURE (September 24, 2013) (documenting
examples of federally funded university patents that have been transferred to patent
monetization entities).
13
The Impact of Patent Assertion Entities on Innovation and the Economy Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 113th
Congress (2013), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/impact-patentassertion-entities-innovation-and-economy (statement of Robin Feldman, Director of
Institute for Innovation Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law,
that leaving out universities and associated joint ventures could potentially create a
loophole, if such provisions are not carefully framed to avoid gaming by NPEs, in response
to inquiry by Congressman Ben Lujan); see also Saving High-Tech Innovators from
Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) (creating conditions
to bring a patent infringement claim, among them that the party alleging infringement be:
the original inventor, a university or technology transfer office, or have made substantial
investment in the production or sale of an item covered by the patent.
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past, if reform efforts are not undertaken, our work could do no more than
provide a handy road map for those who would follow. Despite those
concerns, however, we believe this is an important moment in the evolution
of patent trolling. Technology trolling seeped in silently under the radar,
growing to extraordinary dimensions before lawmakers had time to react. In
contrast, life sciences trolling is predictable and in its infancy. If reforms are
implemented before the problem proliferates throughout the industry,
legislators and regulators have a chance to cabin the activity before it
becomes deeply entrenched and before too much harm occurs.
PART I. WHAT IS PATENT TROLLING?
Patent assertion, and the strategic game-playing associated with it, is
not new. Scholars have noted that the assertion of patents by those who do
not use the patents themselves can be found scattered throughout the history
of the US patent system.14 Similarly, agents who brokered sales of patents
can be found as well, with such brokers earning the title of ―patent sharks‖
in the 19th Century.15
In recent years, however, the market for patent trading and patent
assertion has expanded dramatically, reaching an extraordinary scope and
level of sophistication. Studies show that the percentage of patent litigation
by those who do not make products has increased from roughly 25% in
2007 to almost 60% in 2012.16 In other words, as of 2012, the majority of
litigation is filed by those whose core business involves asserting patents,
rather than making products. This, of course, is only the tip of the iceberg.
14

Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2007) (―[A]mong a host of dormant
patents, some will be found which contain some new principle … which the inventor,
however, had failed to render of any use in his own invention. And some other inventor,
ignorant that such a principle had been discovered … had the genius to render it of great
practical value … when, lo! The patent-sharks among the legal profession, always on the
watch for such cases, go to the first patentee and, for a song, procure an assignment of his
useless patent, and at once proceed to levy black-mail upon the inventor of the valuable
patent.‖) (quoting Sen. Isaac Christiancy, 8 Cong. Reg. 307 (1878)).
15
See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Kenneth L. Sokoloff, and Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Patent
Alchemy: The Market for Technology in US History, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 3, 21 (2013)
(documenting attorneys who served as patent brokers in the nineteenth century).
16
See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities (forthcoming UCLA JOURNAL OF L. & TECH. 2014); see also
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC

hearing on PAEs, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (December 10, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (using data from
RPX corporation and concluding that the percentage of litigation by nonpracticing entities in 2012 has reached 62%).
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Estimates suggest that 90% of patent demands never proceed to litigation,
either because the target ignores the demand or because the target pays the
demand to avoid the costs and risks of litigation, regardless of the merit of
the claim.17
Complexity breeds opportunity, and the patent system is nothing if
not complex. In fact, one of the authors has argued that patents themselves
are best understood as an opportunity to bargain, rather than as a form of
clear, definitive rights. It is tremendously difficult to know what the
language of a patent covers, and it can cost as much as one to six million
dollars to find out through a patent lawsuit.18 Moreover, if a product
company challenges a patent and loses, in addition to the litigation costs,
the company could be facing enormous damages, and even the possibility
that its product could be shut down entirely. These are heady risks, and ones
that rational companies might choose to avoid. The risks are not just the
quantifiable costs of lawyers and experts. Recent academic work also
documents the less tangible costs such as distraction to management,
difficulty obtaining investors, and the need to retool the product.
Two other key issues in modern patent law have helped facilitate the
rise of modern patent trolling. For some time, many of the most
sophisticated players in the patent games, and many of those who owned
large patent portfolios, were product companies. If a product company
launched its patents against someone else, the target company would just
launch its own set of patents in return, putting the original company‘s
17

According to figures in a 2013 White House report on patent assertion & U.S.
innovation, conservative estimates place the number of patent demand threats in 2011 at a
minimum of 60,000 and more likely at over 100,000. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION & U.S. INNOVATION 6 (2013). Approximately 3,500 patent
infringement lawsuits were filed in 2011. See Feldman, Ewing, Jeruss, America Invents Act
500 Expanded: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, (forthcoming UCLA J.L. & TECH.
2014). Thus, just 3.50% to 5.83% of patent demands develop into patent litigation. See
also Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the Dec 10, 2012
DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs at 23–27 (2012), SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK
(December 10, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314
(citing In re Innovatio Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (noting that Innovatio had sent over 8,000 demand letters but brought only a few
dozen suits)).
18
Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations
and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 34, 63 (2012); Tom Ewing, Practical
Considerations in the Indirect Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations
and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 119, 131
(2012); see also American Intellectual Property Association, 2011 Report of the
Economic Survey (2011) (For a patent infringement claim that could be worth less than a
$1 million, median legal costs are $650,000. When $1 million to $25 million is considered
at risk, total litigation costs can hit $2.5 million. For a claim over $25 million, median
legal costs are $5 million.).
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products at risk. Thus, a form of mutually assured destruction and common
risk aversion acted as a natural break on patent demands. In the new market
for patent monetization, monetizers do not make products and may be
organized to hold few assets. Thus, they are free to initiate a patent attack,
knowing that there is little to launch in return.
Modern patent assertion begins by exploiting the high costs and
risks of patent litigation. Offer a settlement comfortably below the point of
cost and risk, and a rational company may choose to settle. The techniques
can be even more effective with a group of patents. Suppose I claim that
your smartphone infringes my patent on gumballs. That may seem pretty
far-fetched to you, and you may be unlikely to settle. Suppose, however, I
threaten to throw a hundred patents at you as well. The simple process of
determining whether any of the patents might have a valid claim against
your product is costly, let alone the costs and risks of litigating the entire
lot. Under these circumstances, a rational company might choose to settle,
regardless of the merits of the claims. I think of these as peddler‘s bag
monetizers.
In a variant on that theme, some monetizers try to assert their patents
widely against large numbers of targets, asking for moderate settlement
amounts, and hoping to reap a healthy profit in the aggregate. I think of this
as an assault rifle approach, aiming rapid fire at a wide number of targets at
the same time.
Some of the assault rifle trolls have begun to target the end users of
products, rather than those who make products themselves. For example,
coffee shops and hotels have received demand letters from monetizers,
asking for payment for the fact their locations have wifi installed, which
allegedly infringes a patent the monetizer holds related to wifi equipment.
Similarly, small businesses have received demand letters asking for
payment based on their use of office equipment such as scanning to a fax
machine. Information and resource asymmetries make this type of
monetization particularly troubling. Small mom-and-pop stores are unlikely
to have the resources and experience with patenting to even be able to
investigate the validity of the claim. While larger end users, such as hotels,
may have more resources, they are likely to lack experience with the
technology asserted in a way that would allow them to easily evaluate the
merits.
Targeting really large end users can have the effect of vastly
increasing a monetizer‘s returns, given the way that damages are calculated.
For example, suppose I hold a patent that I want to assert against those who
make software related to tracking bank customers. If I sue the software
company, my damages may be calculated as a percentage of the software
sales, for example, fifty million dollars. If I sue each of the banks‘
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customers, however, I may be able to get damages calculated on the base of
sales for all of the combined business of the banks, which could be five
hundred million. Although in theory, damages should be rationalized to the
actual value contributed by the patent, in reality, damages can be based
more loosely on the percentages of products and revenue.19 This multiplies
the risk and the settlement value when dealing with large end users.
In contrast, some patent monetizers operate along the lines of what
one scholar has described as ―lottery ticket trolls.‖20 Less interested in large
indiscriminate portfolios and quick settlements, they are interested in higher
value patents that can bring larger settlements from blockbuster companies.
This approach, as well as other modern monetization approaches, is aided
by the proliferation of software and business method patents. Problems with
this type of patent are discussed in detail in Rethinking Patent Law, but a
brief explanation is the following. As computer related inventions
proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s, inventors tried to find ways that the
PTO and the courts would accept that these inventions were patentable.
Early Supreme Court forays suggested that the key to patentability lay in
avoiding anything that looked like math or formulas. Rather, one should
describe the invention in simple industrial terms. Thus, we have settled into
a system in which software and business method patents simply name in
abstract terms what the invention does, without specifying how the inventor
actually accomplished it.21 For example, the goal in Diehr was curing
rubber;22 the goal in Flook was operating hydrocarbon machinery;23 the
goal in LabCorp was treating patients with vitamin B12 and folic-acid
19

See Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1702 (2010) (―The likely
scenario in such a case is then this: A jury, when presented with portfolio licensing
exemplars under which royalties may be as high as 5-8% of the licensee's revenues, will
combine these high rates with evidence showing total sales of a successful, complex
product and reach a conclusion on damages that bears no reasonable relationship to the
value of an individual patented component.‖); see also ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River
Polymers, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 560, 577 (E.D. Tex. 2010) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 668
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926
F.2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―[T]he factual determination of a reasonable royalty . . .
need not be supported, and indeed, frequently is not supported by the specific figures
advanced by either party.‖).
20
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2013).
21
See Robin Feldman, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 111–13, 130–35 (2012). Mark
Lemley refers to this as ―functional claiming.‖ Mark Lemley, Software Patents and the
Return of Functional Claiming 7 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2117302, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117302.
22
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
23
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586, (1978).
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deficiencies.24 Framing in that manner does not provide much in the way of
a dividing line for separating what is patentable from what is unpatentable.
25

Patents such as these have an extraordinary reach into many types of
inventions, particularly if they are drafted broadly. They can wreak havoc
when later asserted in the market place after companies have already
developed products.
Yet another version of patent monetization involves product
companies themselves. As monetization has taken off, many product
companies have begun spinning off non-core assets to monetizers, who then
assert those patents against other product companies. The activity can be a
rational form of asset management. However, it can also be a more
troubling behavior known as privateering.26 With privateering, a product
company transfers assets to a monetizer in an attempt to raise its rivals‘
costs of operation, thereby damaging them as a competitior. In other words,
as a product company, if I launch patents at my competitor, the competitor
is likely to counter-sue, putting my own projects at risk. It I transfer the
patents to a third-party monetizer with no products, keeping a license for
myself, that monetizer can launch against my competitors, and I am safe. If
the transfer agreement is structured so that I receive a return on the
monetizer‘s assertion campaign, I can raise my rival‘s costs and directly
profit from the activity, all from a safe distance.
Even more complex and sophisticated variations on these themes
have emerged. For example, suppose a product company has a group of
patents related to a particular technology. Rather than transferring the group
of patents to one monetizer, the company divides the patents up among ten
monetizers. I refer to this tactic as disaggregation. With disaggregation, the
company can multiply the returns from the group of patents, as well as
multiplying any damage to a competitor.
Many of these patents were never intended to directly earn a profit.
The companies developed them as a method of protecting the operating
space around their core technology. Now, however, those patents are being
stripped off, repurposed and launched in ways that can multiply their
damage in the marketplace.
This echoes the more general problem with modern monetization.
The patent office has very little time to spend reviewing any individual

24

Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
25
See Robin Feldman, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 111–13, 130–35.
26
Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations
and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2012).
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patent.27 Estimates suggest that the patent office may spend only 18 hours
spread over a period of two years on a patent application.28 Thus, individual
patents, and individual claims within each patent, may be problematic.29 For
some time, this posed little difficulty. The vast majority of patents never
earned any direct return, and society could take comfort in the fact that
important patents would have their claims tested in court. Now that patents
are being traded as commodities and grouped for new purposes, the sheer
volume of active patents of uncertain value and scope is straining the patent
system.30
With any invention, the ability to scale and mass produce opens new
possibilities for market expansion and proliferation. Patent monetization is
no different. The sheer amount of patent demand activity is staggering, as is
the variety of models and approaches. The impact on companies is dramatic
as well. Although difficult to measure with any accuracy, scholars have
estimated that patent demands are costing US companies over twenty
billion dollars a year.31
In theory, a market for patent monetization could be a positive force.
A market that matched inventors with those who could translate the
inventions into a saleable product would provide a benefit for society
consistent with goals of the patent system. The market for modern market
for patent monetization, however, is not playing out in that manner. There
are almost no new products emerging from this extraordinary amount of
money changing hands. Rather, patent monetization seems to be operating
primarily as a tax on current products. Worse yet, studies suggest that much
of the money changing hands never makes it to inventors but is absorbed by
the monetizers themselves.32 Thus, in economic terms, the patent
monetization system is operating as a tremendously leaky bucket, one that
appears to be harming consumers and innovation.
27

Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 250, 264
(2013).
28
Id.
29
Id. (―[W]ith the limited amount of time patent examiners have to spend on each
application, the patent office is unlikely to catch all of the claims that reach too far.‖).
30
Id. at 265 (―The modern combination of Magnification and monetization is playing
out in ways that are inconsistent with the goals of the patent system.‖).
31
James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of
Patent Trolls, 34:4 REGULATION 26 (Winter 2011–2012).
32
James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2012.html; see also Joe Mullin,
Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites the history of encryption (Nov. 21 2013,
2:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-on-trial-mystery-companytqp-re-writes-the-history-of-encryption (the monetizing entity TQP has earned $45 million
through patent licensing settlements while the original patentee has earned only $585,000).
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As concerns have escalated over the problem of patent trolling,
everyone has scrambled to define terms. In this highly charged atmosphere,
no one wants to be branded a bad guy, and if patent trolls are bad guys,
everyone wants the definition to point somewhere else. And, indeed,
numerous definitions—and variations on those definitions—have been
offered to define the notion of patent trolling. Many use the term nonpracticing entity, or NPE, in reference to entities that do not use the patents
they own to create anything. In the code-like language of patents, using the
ideas in the patent to create a product is called ―practicing the patent,‖ and
thus, those who do not create products are called ―non-practicing.‖ Among
many others, Congress has used the term NPE in directing the non-partisan
General Accounting Office to study the topic.33
Problems with the term include the question of whether to include
universities in the definition. Universities are in the business of scientific
research and education, and they generally do not engage in the production
of products from their inventions.34 Thus, they do not actually practice the
ideas in their patent portfolios. In addition, a term that references only
entities is also problematic. Some of the most famous modern examples of
those who do not practice the ideas in their patents, but use the patents to
demand license fees from others, are individuals.35
One of us has argued elsewhere that the key definitional question is
not the identity of the acting entity—corporation, individual, university, or
33

See Pub.L. No. 112-29 § 34 (2011) (directing the nonpartisan General
Accounting Office to study the consequences of litigation by non-practicing
entities); see also 157 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. September 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (discussing the General Accounting
Office‘s requirements under § 34 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
to study the ―nature and impact of lawsuits brought by non-practicing
entities‖).
34

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (University-sanctioned
research projects ―further the institution‘s legitimate business objectives, including
educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects‖ as well as
―increas[ing] the status of the institution and lur[ing] lucrative research grants, students and
faculty.‖). But cf. id. at n.7 (―Duke‘s patent and licensing policy may support its primary
function as an educational institution. . . . Duke, however, like other major research
institutions of higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licensing
program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream.‖)
35
See, e.g., Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 457, 470
(2012)(referencing Ronald A. Katz as a well-known and high-profile NPEs); David Segal,
Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, NEW YORK TIMES (JULY 13, 2013)
(profiling
Erich
Spangenberg),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert-to-corporateamerica.html
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otherwise—but the activity engaged in.36 We define the relevant activity
broadly, to include not only litigating patents but also engaging in patentbased demands, which is likely to have similar economic effects on
industry, if not on the judicial system.37 We also think that including only
those who purchase and then assert patents narrows the relevant activity too
far; practicing firms which generate patents not intended for
commercialization may assert them themselves, spin off sub-entities to
assert their patents, or license them for assertion.38 Similarly, classical
patent assertion entities could get into the business of filing patents not
intended for commercialization to avoid any fixed definition relying on
patent purchase.39 However, these are complex issues, and need not be
fully resolved here. To address the questions at hand broadly, we will use
the term ―monetizers‖ as one of us has previously proposed, which includes
all entities and individuals ―whose core business involves licensing and
litigating patents, rather than making products.‖40
PART II. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
The variety and complexity of the players, and the range of behavior
involved, in the market for patent monetization makes the issue difficult to
tackle. Moreover, innovation is never an easy issue to predict or incentivize,
and it remains the driving force of the US economy. The challenge is
finding ways to deter abusive behavior without inadvertently harming
innovation.
Despite the challenges, legislators and regulators at both the state
and federal level are working on proposals to mitigate problems from patent
monetization.41 The discussion has centered largely on issues related to
technology, however, with biotech and pharmaceuticals on the sidelines.
This is not surprising. Conventional wisdom holds that patent
monetization is a problem for high-technology, but not for biotechnology or
36

Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Venture
Capital
Community,
11–19,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346338 (2013).
37
Id. at 12–13.
38
Id. at 13–19.
39
Id. at 16–17.
40
Id. at 19.
41
See, e.g., Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013,
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong.
(2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent
Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation and
Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013); Stopping the Offensive Use of
Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong.
(2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013).
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pharmaceuticals, and that any solutions must be designed to avoid
impacting bio and pharma. The section below describes the conventional
thinking, and explores its weaknesses.
A. Never the Twain Shall Meet42
A cost comparison between the bio/ pharmaceutical and high-tech
industries reveals a stark contrast in both spending levels and business
philosophy.
Drug companies spend large sums on research and
development, often facing daunting failure rates. In contrast, the technology
industry seems to reward those companies that spend less on research and
development, a trend that has encourage a proliferation of low-end software
markets that lower the barrier to entry for smaller companies.
For example, pharmaceutical industry statistics suggest that the
average cost of developing a successful new drug in 2007 fell between $800
million and $1 billion,43 and the cost has risen to $1.3 billion in 2012.44
Outside studies using drug industry data suggest that the figure has grown
even higher in 2013.45 Although scholars have disputed the derivation of
these figures, 46 it is clear that drug development is not for the faint of heart.
A significant factor in these skyrocketing costs is the impact of the
42

Rudyard Kipling, The Ballad of East and West, in A VICTORIAN ANTHOLOGY, 18371895 (Edmund Clarence Stedman, Ed.) (Riverside Press 1895)(containing the famous line,
―Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet‖).
43
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PHRMA), Drug
Discovery and Development: Understanding the R&D Process, INNOVATION.ORG 1b
(numberless
page
immediately
following
1)
(Feb.
2007),
http://www.innovation.org/drug_discovery/objects/pdf/RD_Brochure.pdf.
See
also
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, About Us,
INNOVATION.ORG (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (explaining that Innovation.org is a ―project of
the
Pharmaceutical
Research
and
Manufacturers
of
America‖),
http://www.innovation.org/index.cfm/About/About_Us.
44
See, e.g., Amy O‘Connor, Football - By the Numbers, LILLYPAD: THE PLACE FOR
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND HEALTH CARE INNOVATION (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://lillypad.lilly.com/entry.php?id=1583 (Blog entry for Eli Lilly stating that the cost of
developing a new drug had risen to $1.3 billion, and making various football-related
comparisons regarding what that amount could buy, such as the number of Superbowl ads).
45
Matthew Herper, The Cost Of Creating A New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big
Pharma To Change, FORBES: PHARMA & HEALTHCARE (Aug. 11, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-ofinventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/.
46
Donald W Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the high costs of
pharmaceutical research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34 (2011) (criticizing the study underlying these
figures for excluding tax credits for research and development and including cost of capital,
that is, the amount companies could have made by investing the money, rather than
spending it on R&D).
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expenses that follow the development of a drug once it has been discovered.
For example, clinical trials for high-profile drugs can cost as much as $100
million alone.47
Indeed, for some drugs the ―combined cost of
manufacturing and clinical testing [alone] . . . has added up to $1 billion.‖
Further adding to R&D expenses is the fact that certain costs continue to
add up even after a drug hits the market. 48 For example, companies
customarily monitor reports of a successful drug‘s side effects to ensure
safety, an endeavor that requires massive amounts of manpower and
organization.49 Johnson & Johnson‘s safety infrastructure alone employs
nearly 1,000 people, an infrastructure that the company‘s Co-Chairman of
Pharmaceuticals Paul Stoffels has noted is enough people to form an entire
biotech company.50
Drug companies also cite the unavoidably high failure rate of drug
research as a key factor in the high Research & Development costs.
According to a recent industry publication, ―[f]or every 5,000-10,000
compounds that enter the research and development . . . pipeline, ultimately
only one receives approval.‖51 An August 2013 Forbes study concluded
that 19 out of every 20 drugs being developed ultimately fails, a 95 percent
failure rate.52 All of these factors combine to make drug development an
expensive and risky endeavor.
To compare costs between the biotech/pharmaceutical industry and
the technology industry – particularly its most successful players – is to
compare two fundamentally different strategies on R&D spending. Success
in the technology industry has come to those who target their R&D
sparingly toward the creation of new markets.
Indeed, most studies of the technology industry have shown that
technology companies cannot spend their way toward success. For
example, in 2011, software giant Microsoft pumped more than any other
company in the technology industry into R&D, at $9.0 billion (just behind
Pfizer, holding steady at $9.1 billion) or 12.9 percent of its sales.53 The
results of these expenditures, however, were primarily evolutionary
upgrades to its existing Windows operating system and Office software,
updates that were seen as largely incremental.54 During this period, the
47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Herper, supra note 45.
51
Drug Discovery and Development, supra note 43.
52
Herper, supra note 45.
53
Max Nisen, The 20 Biggest Corporate R&D Spenders In The World, BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Oct
31,
2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-research-anddevelopment-spender-2012-10.
54
Adam Hartung, Top 20 R&D Spenders - Not Good Investments, FORBES (Nov. 5,
48
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company‘s attempts to reestablish its former dominance in mobile phones
have been largely unsuccessful, and outgoing CEO Steve Ballmer has
admitted that his company now has ―almost no share‖ in that market.55
The opposite has been true for Microsoft‘s rival, Apple. With a net
income of $41.7 billion in 2012, Apple remains not only the most profitable
technology company in the U.S. but also the second-most profitable
company in the world, behind Exxon.56 Despite its dramatic success, Apple
spends significantly less on R&D than its competitors. In 2012, Apple
spent $3.4 billion on R&D, only 2 percent of its sales – a percentage that
remained the same as in 2011.57 Indeed, the company has stated that this
level of targeted spending is a key element of its business strategy: ―[Apple]
continues to believe that focused investments in R&D are critical to its
future growth and competitive position in the marketplace.‖58
Apple‘s success in the iPhone and iPad products, and its policies
regarding compatible products, has helped spark a revolution in the
software industry. Indeed, the application economy that has arisen as a
result of consumers‘ demand for mobile applications has facilitated the
development of the lower end of the software industry. Barriers to entry are
low enough that it is easier and cheaper than ever for small companies to
enter the market and create apps without substantial investment. In a recent
report, the Government Accountability Office offered a passing anecdote
that exemplifies this newfound ease of market entry and development:
―[R]epresentatives from one small software company we spoke with said
that they could develop a product in a little as 2 months with only a few
programmers.‖59
Within platform ecosystems like Apple‘s, established technology
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2012/11/05/top-20-rd-spenders-not-goodinvestments/.
55
Tom Warren, Ballmer sees Microsoft's ‘almost no share’ in mobile as an
opportunity,
regrets
mistakes,
THE
VERGE
(Sep.
19,
2013),
http://www.theverge.com/2013/9/19/4750086/ballmer-almost-no-mobile-share-microsoftopportunity.
56
BLOOMBERG, Most Profitable in Technology in U.S.: Companies,
http://www.bloomberg.com/visual-data/best-and-worst/most-profitable-in-technology-in-udot-s-companies (last visited Oct. 9, 2013); BLOOMBERG, Top 20 by Profits Worldwide:
Companies,
http://www.bloomberg.com/visual-data/best-and-worst/top-20-by-profitsworldwide-companies (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
57
Josh Lowensohn, Apple R&D spending up nearly 40 percent in 2012, CNET (Oct.
31,
2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57543370-37/apple-r-d-spending-upnearly-40-percent-in-2012/.
58
Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Oct. 31, 2012).
59
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP
IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY, GAO-13-465, at 35 (2013).
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companies actively encourage other companies to create products that build
upon their own innovations, an inherently interdependent business model
that makes it a lot easier to enter the industry. For example, the company
makes it easier for software developers to create iPhone applications by
giving them free access to the iPhone‘s underlying technology through its
developer tools.60 This makes it much simpler for a developer to implement
certain basic features found in all mobile apps that most users take for
granted, such as the ability to have animated buttons that react to the user‘s
touch.61 A startup company looking to create the next great iPhone
application does not have to expend nearly as much time or energy creating
the underlying technologies needed for their app to function properly as
they would otherwise have to. Smaller developers that would not otherwise
have the resources to enter the software development market can now do so.
Platform-steward companies such as Apple also provide the
underlying infrastructure for delivering applications and transacting
payments for those applications on their respective app stores. 62 Thus,
smaller developers, since they can offer their products to consumers through
a sales portal built into each device – a feature that makes the devices
themselves more compelling as well.
Overall, the rise of the application economy and the degree to which
it has facilitated the proliferation of small software businesses is indicative
of a broader trend in the technology industry toward lower costs and easy
access. This stands in sharp contrast to R&D-heavy industries like
pharmaceuticals, in which smaller companies cannot easily enter the market
because each player must shoulder heavy development costs. In other
words, you cannot do biotech in your garage, but you can certainly write a
software application—or even found a computer company.63
The costs of entry and the structure of the industry affect
conventional wisdom about the industry‘s relative safety from patent
trolling. The long lead time and extensive financial investment necessary
for a bio/pharmaceutical product creates the sense that all relevant patents
60

See
APPLE
INC.,
About
Xcode,
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/ToolsLanguages/Conceptual/Xcode
_Overview/About_Xcode/about.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
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INC.,
About
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iOS
Frameworks,
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Miscellaneous/Conceptual/iPhoneO
STechOverview/Introduction/Introduction.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
62
Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple Announces iPhone 2.0 Software Beta (Mar. 6,
2008) (available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/03/06Apple-Announces-iPhone2-0-Software-Beta.html) (―Apple will cover all credit card, web hosting, infrastructure and
DRM costs associated with offering applications on the App Store.‖).
63
Daniel Terdiman, Road Trip kickoff: The garage where the HP legend began, CNET
(June 19, 2009, 11:55 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13772_3-10268615-52.html.
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will have emerged. As one commentator noted, ―Before biotech companies
decide to go into the market, they might be more cognizant or concerned
about whether they have time to operate, because they‘re going to invest a
lot of time and money to get there. . . . biotech takes so long to get into any
commercial embodiment that people know about the patent to begin
with.‖64
Similarly, the difficulty of entering the bio/pharmaceutical product
market suggests that there will be fewer patents floating around that
monetizers can acquire and fewer targets for them to go after. ―It‘s a
different life cycle between the patents and technology development. It
reduces the number of targets for infringement because [the
commercialization pathway] reduces the number of people who are going to
get on the market.‖65 With fewer possible patents and fewer targets, trolling
in the bio/pharmaceutical industry could be less lucrative on the whole.
The numbers limitation also applies to the products themselves.
Technology products tend to have multiple components. This makes it more
likely that a patent monetizer can find a patent that relates to some part of
the product somehow. The method by which courts assess patent
infringement damages also makes multiple component products a more
appealing target. Under some damages approaches, a small component can
command a large share of the revenue, leading to greater leveraging power
when demanding a license.66 As one scholar noted, monetizers are less
troublesome in the pharmaceutical sector because pharmaceutical products
have one patent for one arduously researched chemical.67
The type of patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries also reduce the appeal of monetization in comparison to patents
in high technology. Technology patents tend to be broader, particularly in
the software arena. As described above, in an attempt to avoid being labeled
as an unpatentable mathematical formula, software patents are drafted in
prose language that describes what the software does, rather than how the
inventor accomplished it.68 This leads to the happy coincidence of broad
patents with unclear boundaries and a remarkably wide potential reach. In
64

See Alex Philippidis, New Gene Patent Suit Sparks Talk of Trolls,
GENENGNEWS.COM,
http://www.genengnews.com/insight-and-intelligenceand153/newgene-patent-suit-sparks-talk-of-trolls/77899863.
65
See id.
66
See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 49 (Harvard 2012) (describing
problems in modern patent damage calculations).
67
See Stu Hutson, Pharma ‘patent trolls’ remain mostly the stuff of myth, 15 NATURE
MEDICINE 1240 (2009), available at http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1038/nm11091240a.
68
For a history of how modern software patenting has developed and a description of
the resulting problems, see FELDMAN, supra note 66, at 104–24.
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contrast, patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical space are more
limited, hewing somewhat better to the more traditional restriction that a
patent should describe not just the idea but how to implement the idea.
Once again, broad patents have a wider reach and provide better weapons to
launch in a monetization campaign—which suggests that monetizers will
choose to populate the technology industry, rather than biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals.
Finally, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have been
less concerned about patent trolling because it they have yet to experience
it—at least not to the extent of the technology industry. Early studies
suggested that patent trolling activity was largely concentrated in the
technology sector, rather than biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.69 The
relative lack of patent trolling activity in the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical sectors leads to the sense that, ―if it is not on my doorstep, I
have nothing to fear.‖
B. Fallacies in the Conventional Wisdom
There is much truth to the conventional wisdom. Biotechnology and
pharmaceutical research does involve a greater investment of time, money
and expertise. This results in fewer patents, fewer targets, and a longer lead
time for problems to emerge. In addition, developments in product type and
patent rules affect the opportunities for patent demands. Biotech and
pharmaceutical products tend to have fewer components, and patents in the
field tend to be less broad than the software and business method patents
that proliferate in the technology industry.
However, the conventional wisdom suffers from three weaknesses.
First, it ignores the role that regulation plays in making some
pharmaceutical patents harder to invent around, thus raising the potential
hold-up costs of what patents are available to monetize. Second, it assumes
a classical model of patent bargaining, rather than the strategic bargaining
and suit filing adopted by modern monetizers. Third, it assumes that
monetizers will confine themselves to a relatively narrow set of
technological targets; while high-tech may be low-hanging fruit, the
proliferation and increasing sophistication of monetizers means that other
industries are likely to be targeted in the near future.
69

Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION
(September
15,
2013),
http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20and%
20Startup%20Innovation_updated.pdf (finding that 88% of the technology venture
capitalists surveyed (N=66) had experienced demands from non-practicing entities, as
compared to 13% of bio/pharma or medical device venture capitalists surveyed (N=23)).
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1. Regulatory barriers to inventing around in biopharmaceuticals70
Conventional wisdom ignores the ways that regulatory barriers
make patent holdup particularly costly in biopharmaceuticals by increasing
the cost of ―inventing around.‖ The idea of inventing around is simple: if
someone holds a patent on one aspect of a product, someone wishing to
make that product must either a) license the patent or b) change the product
or production method to avoid using the patented technology. The second
path is the process of ―inventing around.‖71
In the context of patent litigation or negotiations, the costs of
inventing around the patent are a crucial factor. Setting aside damages and
litigation costs—which may be significant—the hold-up value of a potential
injunction depends on the difficulty of inventing around. The manufacturer
has an expectation of profits based on the status quo; a monetizer (or a
competitor) who can assert a blocking patent should be able to extract no
more than the value of keeping the status quo over shifting to another aspect
of production—that is, inventing around the blocked technology and
implementing that invention. If the costs of inventing around are very low
(for example, switching one off-the-shelf for another off-the-shelf part), the
value of avoiding the injunction may be very low. If the costs are very high
(for example, if the technology covers a key technology to the product), the
value of avoiding the injunction is correspondingly high. For example,
RIM was willing to settle for $612.5 million when the alternative was an
injunction preventing it from using the central technology in its BlackBerry
communications devices.72
70

See generally Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On
Biologics, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 13–20 (2012); Jonathan Stroud, The Illusion of
Interchangeability: The Benefits and Dangers of Guidance-Plus Rulemaking in the FDA’s
Biosimilar Approval Process, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 624 (2011) (―[T]he burden of
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may lie under the doctrine of equivalents.‖).
72
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The FDA‘s regulatory apparatus strengthens many patents in the
biopharmaceutical industry by adding regulatory barriers to the
technological and marketing costs of inventing around a blocked
technology.73 In the strongest case, it is essentially impossible to invent
around a composition-of-matter patent covering the active pharmaceutical
ingredient of a drug, because changing the active pharmaceutical ingredient
of a drug necessarily changes the drug itself and generally requires an
entirely new FDA approval process, including new clinical trials.74 Such a
patent would therefore provide a very strong blocking patent. Accordingly,
a patent monetizer holding a previously unknown but valid patent covering
a drug‘s active pharmaceutical ingredient could potentially extract a large
portion of the value of the drug.
FDA approval processes provide similar—though less drastic—
regulatory barriers to inventing around patents on methods of
manufacturing drugs,75 particular dosage forms, or methods of treatment.
Firms can still potentially invent around such patents, but the costs of doing
so are significantly increased by regulatory costs associated with such
changes.
2. The assumption of classical patent bargaining and suits
The conventional wisdom is also premised on a model of patent
bargaining in which the value and relevance of each patent in relation to a
potential infringing product is carefully weighed, the spurious demands
drop out, and the more meritorious claims advance to a court for
determination. It is a world in which the relevant players are evident, and a
certain level of discipline is imposed by the fear that one‘s target could
launch its own patent stockpile back at you, threatening your own products.
(March 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/
73
See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
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ingredient and that ingredient is patented, then the patent will be difficult for generics to
design around even if it is narrow since any change the generic firms make to the active
ingredient would likely trigger the FDA's clinical-trial requirements.‖).
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Application as a generic version of the brand-name drug. But even in this case, production
or sale of the original drug would still be blocked by the patent; the replacement process
would merely be somewhat easier.
75
See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311682, 25–31.
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Modern patent monetization is an entirely different ballgame. Much
of monetization operates effectively from leverage available through the
costs and risks of patent litigation. In some cases, that leverage is achieved
by the simple costs of challenging the license. With patent cases costing $1
million to $6 million dollars,76 it may be cheaper for a company to settle
against a determined monetizer. That leverage is magnified when patents
are grouped together. A company that is tempted to fight off one patent may
not have the stomach, or the litigation budget, to fight off 150 patents. In
larger groupings, the validity of each individual patent become less
important, and effective strategies can include a group of questionable
patents—or patents that may not truly apply in this case—with one or two
higher value patents thrown in.
Multiplicity has another benefit for increasing leverage. Under
current rules and practices, patent holders do not need to articulate the basis
for their assertion that a target is infringing their patent. They do not need to
even identify which claim in the patent is being infringed, in their view, or
which aspect of product infringes.77 As a result, the burden of investigating
a patent demand falls entirely on the company receiving the demand, while
the monetizer can spend very little. When a company is faced with a claim
that they are infringing 50 patents from a monetizer with a reputation for
tough tactics and determination, a rational company may choose to settle,
rather than engage in the considerable expense of even studying those
patents in the first place.
The same lack of specificity exists for patent lawsuits, as well as
patent demands. In most federal cases, heightened pleading standards now
require a certain level of specificity when filing a complaint. These
standards were imposed by two Supreme Court cases, Twombly and Iqbal,
which are sometime colloquially referred to as ―Twiqbal.”78 Federal Circuit
76

Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations
and Investors, supra note 19 at 63; Tom Ewing, Practical Considerations in the Indirect
Deployment of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors, supra note 119,
131; see also American Intellectual Property Association, 2011 Report of the Economic
Survey (2011) (For a patent infringement claim that could be worth less than a $1 million,
median legal costs are $650,000. When $1 million to $25 million is considered at risk,
total litigation costs can hit $2.5 million. For a claim over $25 million, median legal costs
are $5 million.).
77
See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2013: Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013,
PatentlyO (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/11/patent-reform-2013demand-letter-transparency-act-of-2013.html; Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013,
H.R. 3540, 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring, inter alia, that patent infringement demand
letters identify each patent and each claim asserted, each allegedly infringing
instrumentality by name and model number, and whether each instrumentality infringes
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents).
78
See Dennis Crouch, Pleading Requirements: Patent Reform through the Supreme
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case law, however, has ruled that these cases and their heightened pleading
standards do not apply to patent lawsuits, which can be filed according to
bare bones pleading forms established in 1934. Thus, patent holders can
proceed to discovery with very little on the table.
Not all monetizers are interested in the leverage of multiplicity. One
scholar refers to ―lottery-ticket trolls,‖ who are looking for one patent that
can strike fear into the hearts of an entire industry. 79 Even in those cases,
however, leverage plays an important role. Given difficulties in the
doctrines related to calculating patent damages, a patent that makes a small
contribution to the overall product can yield a payoff well beyond its
proportionate value to the eventual product.80
In addition to damages, injunctions are still a real threat. A company
could find itself completely enjoined from making or selling its product, a
potential disaster if the product at issue holds the company‘s profitability.
At one point, injunctions were routinely granted under Federal Circuit
precedent upon any successful infringement claim. The Supreme Court
changed this practice in the case of eBay v. Mercexchange, ruling that
courts in patent cases must apply the same 4-part test as in other injunction
cases.81 Although the percentage of injunctions granted since eBay has
declined, injunction is still a threat in the Federal Courts. In addition, the
ITC has declined to apply the eBay principles to its cases.82 The threat of
Court and Judicial Conference, Patently-O (Feb. 11, 2014) (contrasting pleading standards
for patent lawsuits with standards for other federal cases and using the term, ―Twiqbal‖),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/heightened-requirements-conference.html
79
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013).
80
See FELDMAN, supra note76, at 84-86 (describing problems in patent damages
calculations). (―In particular, the details of determining the proper royalty rate and base of
sales provide little assurance of an accurate outcome . . . One practitioner describes the
Georgia Pacific test as more often involving the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.
This hypothetical, or some would say mythical, bargaining is intended to lead to a
reasonable approximation of the damages from infringement. Nevertheless, scholars and
commentators have complained that it all too often leads to ridiculous results.); Mark A.
Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, supra note 92, 2143 (―[F]or both legal and practical
reasons damages in patent infringement suits . . . are not only somewhat unpredictable but,
as a general matter, excessive.‖).
81
See eBay v. Mercexchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (detailing the four-part test as
requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate, ―(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction‖).
82
Spansion, Inc. v. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(―[T]his court holds that eBay does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under
Section 337.‖).
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out-sized damages and a downright shutdown of the product creates enough
leverage that companies may choose to settle, irrespective of the merits of
the claim. Again, a determined monetizer with a strong reputation can
create the leverage to make companies settle.
The point is simply the following: the success of the modern
monetization business method is not necessarily based on the value of the
patent. That success is, in many ways, attributable to the leverage derived
from the costs and risks of litigation. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical
companies are not immune to the power of that leverage. In fact, those
fields have additional leverage points. A company that is on the cusp of
FDA approval for a drug--following a decade of developing the product and
engaging in medical trials—may be particularly vulnerable to threats of
patent litigation.
3. The assumption of tightly clustered targets for monetizers
The conventional wisdom suffers from a third weakness as well. It is
based on the premise that patent trolls will only go after the best and most
lucrative market. It is certainly true that technology provides better trolling
grounds than biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Smartphones, which may
involve tens of thousands of patents, provide a much better target than a
drug, whose key patent involves a single chemical composition. Even the
classic unitary patent setting, however, will involve peripheral patents. The
processes of experimentation, production, and distribution involve the use
of numerous technologies, all of which could be vulnerable to patent claims.
Again, imagining that one‘s product is safe because the core product is a
chemical compound, ignores the potential for peripheral risk.
Most important, the allure of patent monetization is drawing an
increasing number of players onto the field, and generating an increasingly
complex array of business models. The field is more crowded and
traditional troll ―customers,‖ such as the technology companies who buy
licenses from them, may reach the saturation point. In this context, markets
that are merely good rather than spectacular, become appealing. Even if the
market were not expanding, one could not rest assured that being a second
best target means one is safe. One may simply be farther down on the list of
potential customers.
Finally, the wolf appears to be at the doorstep—or at least the troll
does. Although the modern version of monetization may have started
largely in the technology sector, it has expanding to other sectors such as
retail, and there are signs that monetization is headed for biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals. For example, press reports note that one of the largest
aggregators holds patents for purifying nucleic acids in its portfolio, and
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IPNav, a notorious patent monetization entity founded by Erich
Spangenberg, describes its platform as ―equally effective for patents in all
scientific and technology fields.‖83 Pharmaceutical company counsel are
facing internal pressure to monetize IP assets which are not being used in
marketed products.84 In addition, as noted above, patent brokers are
beginning to hear from major pharmaceutical companies interested in
shopping their noncore patents to monetizers, and studies of patent demands
against startup companies show monetizers moving into the life science
space.85 Most important, there are increasing signs that universities are
transferring rights to monetizers.86
It is universities, of course, that are the focus of the study we have
undertaken. Part of the narrative that biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are
safe from patent trolling involves the relative lack of appropriate inventory.
We should note, of course, that there are plenty of biotechnology and
pharmaceutical patents outstanding. Nevertheless, while software patents
may be easy to develop, a patent relevant to the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industry will be tougher to develop.
We wondered, however, how university patents could potentially
affect this calculus. This vast storehouse of patents sits largely unused in the
form of extensive portfolios that are rarely licensed or commercialized in
any form. In fact, reports suggest that only 5% of the vast patent holdings
of universities are subject to licensing.87 More recently, the Association of
University Technology Managers is reexamining a 2007 pledge not to sell
to monetizers, driven by financial considerations.88 Our suspicion was that
these university holdings would provide a fertile hunting ground for
monetizers.

83

See Alex Philippidis, New Gene Patent Suit Sparks Talk of Trolls,
GENENGNEWS.COM,
http://www.genengnews.com/insight-and-intelligenceand153/newgene-patent-suit-sparks-talk-of-trolls/77899863.
84
See Shuchman, supra note 10.
85
See supra notes 11–11. With respect to the closely related medical devices industry,
a publication directed to life sciences corporate counsel recently noted that ―NPEs now
seem to be setting their sights on the medical device industry. . . . Further, relatively large
NPEs are aggregating medical device patents at a rapid clip.‖ Harris, Ragosa, and Russell,
supra note 11. Such litigation has had higher success than against other industries, with
median damages of $20 million. Id.
86
Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, 501 NATURE 471 (2013).
87
Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, supra note 86 at 472
(2013).
88
Paul Basken, Under Financial Pressure, Universities Give Patent Buyers a Closer
Look, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Oct. 25, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Under-FinancialPressure/142613.
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PART III. A BRIEF SURVEY OF UNIVERSITY PATENT HOLDINGS

As a proof of concept, we sought to identify a subset of universityheld patents potentially attractive to monetizers.89 This examination was
not intended to be comprehensive; instead, we sought to see what would
emerge from a relatively quick skim through university patent holdings
performed by individuals with moderate knowledge but little experience
and no sophisticated analytical tools. If, as we suspected, patents of
potential interest to monetizers targeting the biopharmaceutical industry
were relatively common, we would expect them to appear during our
search.90 Our suspicions were borne out—we found many patents that
could potentially provide the basis for a suit by monetizers against the
biopharmaceutical industry, or at least bargaining leverage.
A. Approach and methods
We skimmed the patent holdings for four of the of five university
systems with the highest number of patents issued in fiscal year 2011: the
University of California system, the University of Texas system, MIT, and
CalTech.91 We added as a wild-card the University of South Florida, the
school among the top 10 in 2011 patent grants which had the lowest ratio of
license revenues to research expenditures. We searched for patents
assigned to those universities.
It is important to emphasize the deliberate limitations of this search.
The search was performed by one author and one research assistant, each
with a significant scientific background but no extensive experience in
intellectual property litigation or patent prosecution. We spent under 30
total hours identifying potential target patents, briefly skimming the patent
claims, and occasionally looking to other readily available Internet sources
to see whether the patent might be of use to a monetizer. Rather than
attempting to devise sophisticated methodologies based on the search
89

A large-scale empirical analysis of university-held patents potentially of interest to
monetizer‘s might provide useful results. However, such a study is far outside the
parameters of this project.
90
Note that this search could provide support for our hypothesis only asymmetrically;
the absence of monetizer-worthy patents in our relatively unsophisticated search would not
provide proof that such patents do not exist.
91
Sortable Table: Universities With the Most Licensing Revenue, FY 2011, THE
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Aug. 30, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/SortableTable-Universities/133964. The University of Wisconsin/Wisconsin Alumni Research
Fund (WARF) was also among the top 4 research institutions by number 2011 patents
granted, but we excluded it as a target because WARF behaves differently from a typical
university research system and has a long history of actively seeking to commercialize
university research. Id.
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strategies of extant monetizers,92 we simply looked for patents assigned to
the selected universities in what seemed to be relevant subject classes, such
as drugs, chemical reactions, and methods of manufacture, and selected
those patents whose titles seemed promising.93 We also deliberately did
not try to identify available patents which clearly covered a current
commercial product, as this fell too close to our concern of providing a
precise roadmap for monetizers.94
We also spent approximately 8 hours trying a sample more targeted
search. One broad form of patent covers chemical classes by claiming them
using ―Markush‖ claim language,95 which typically include chemical
compositions with a base structure and one or more variable elements, to be
filled from a list of possibilities included in the claim language. We
searched for Markush claims assigned to the universities listed above.96
Many had already been noted in the broad initial skim, but some additional
composition-directed patents appeared which had been missed earlier. This
quick but targeted search yielded an additional 22 targets.
The patents identified in this fashion were then read to determine
whether they could plausibly be used as the basis for suit or negotiation by a
biopharmaceutical-targeting monetizer. Because the vast majority of suits
92

See also IPNav, Best Practices in Patent Monetization 2-3 (June 2012),
http://www.ipnav.com/linkservid/6BB9DE27-5056-9000-03661B5708AD47ED/
(last
visited November 23, 2013) (discussing the criteria used by one patent monetization firm in
selecting patents to monetize, those criteria including a patent‘s value, whether the patent is
being infringed, the strength of the patent, and whether the patent covers core or non-core
technology); cf. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or
Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2829 (2009) (―[T]he most-litigated patents have different, clearly identifiable characteristics,‖
including, ―more claims, more prior art citations, more forward citations, a higher
likelihood of assignment between issue and litigation, and larger numbers of continuation
applications.‖ These patents ―are disproportionately owned by nonpracticing entities‖).
93
The database searched included a total of 21,231 patents across five university
systems, including 7,481 patents in broadly relevant categories. Of these, we skimmed the
text of 179 and identified 48 as potential targets.
94
This choice leaves open the possibility that although we found many promising
patents, none might actually be commercially relevant. Given the diversity and and
ambiguity among the patents we identified, we think this result unlikely.
95
―A Markush-type claim recites alternatives in a format such as ‗selected from the
group consisting of A, B and C.‘‖ MPEP § 803.02 (8th ed. Rev. 8, Aug. 2012) (citing Ex
parte Markush, 1925 Dec. Comm‘r Pat. 126 (1924)). See also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter
Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d
716, 716-17 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
96
Specifically, we searched the USPTO Full Text Database for claims (―ACLM/‖)
including the terms ―‘selected from the group consisting‘ AND ‗drug‘‖ or ―‘selected from
the group consisting‘ AND ‗pharmaceutical‘ ANDNOT ‗drug,‘‖ in patents assigned
(―AN/‖) to the University of California system, the University of Texas system, MIT,
CalTech, or the University of South Florida.
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by monetizers do not depend on proceeding to actual validity or
infringement determinations, we did not attempt to evaluate the patent‘s
validity, and did not attempt careful claim construction. We also did not
attempt to identify specific industry targets likely to infringe the patents, for
reasons both of resource limitations and of not wishing to provide too
straightforward a target list for potential monetizers. Finally, we did not—
and feasibly could not—determine the licensing situation of these patents.
It is possible that some subset of the patents we have identified are in fact
licensed by universities to the relevant potential infringers. Given the
secrecy of licensing arrangements, this is an unavoidable limitation a study
of this kind; however, considering the broad range of industry and
university players, we consider it unlikely that licensing of even potentially
relevant patents is so widespread as to render all industry players safe from
monetizers.
B. Results
We found dozens of potentially assertable patents in several
categories. The parameters of our search mean there are almost certainly
many more to be found by monetizers, who have more time and expertise in
searching. However, the patents we found in our non-intensive search
support our hypothesis: the patent holdings of universities do indeed appear
to hold many patents of potential interest to monetizers seeking to target the
biopharmaceutical industry. Potentially relevant patents cover drugs‘ active
ingredients; methods of treatment; screening methods to identify new drugs;
manufacturing methods; dosage forms; and plausibly related ancillary
technologies (a catchment category including patents useful in a ―peddler‘s
bag‖/―kitchen sink‖ approach but otherwise of relatively attenuated
relationship to industry procedures). This section describes each of the
several types of patents we found, including an exemplar of each type.
1. Active ingredient patents
Every drug relies on active pharmaceutical ingredients, and patents
covering those active pharmaceutical ingredients are clearly the dominant
form of patent in the biopharmaceutical industry. When policy or
scholarship discusses ―drug patents‖ without further elaboration, this type
of patent is meant. Such patents are particularly strong due to the FDA
approval process, as described above; essentially, they cannot be invented
around. Because active pharmaceutical ingredient patents are central to the
patent strategy of drug companies, such patents covering marketed drugs
would be of tremendous use to monetizers, especially of the ―lottery-ticket
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troll‖ variety. They could be potent litigation weapons both before and after
approval, and would provide powerful bargaining tools.
These patents are also the least likely to be found. Typically, the
PTO will not grant multiple patents covering a single chemical, since once
the chemical is disclosed in a patent, the second patent would be barred for
lack of novelty. That said, there is a substantial amount of error at the PTO,
and initial examination involves few resources.97 Drug companies also do
particularly extensive diligence seeking patents that cover potential active
pharmaceutical ingredients, since the patentability of a drug‘s active
pharmaceutical ingredient is a key question in approving the drug‘s
development.98 However, some patents are likely to slip past these efforts
as well, particularly in light of the broad combinatorial nature of Markush
claims for chemical classes.99
Although our search found relatively few composition patents which
appear to cover active pharmaceutical ingredients for a class of
commercially viable or currently marketed drugs, we did find some. 100 For
example, Patent no. 6,437,105, filed November 2, 1999 and assigned to the
University of Texas System, covers a large set of anthracycline-based
antitumor agents.101 Anthracyclines are a widely used class of powerful
97

Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495
(2001).
98
See, e.g., Benjamin Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 512–13 (2009).
99
See note 95, supra.
100
As described above, we did not attempt to find or demonstrate specific instances of
infringement.
101
The patent‘s only independent claim, Claim 1, claims:
A substituted anthracycline having the formula:

wherein
R1 is a hydroxyl group (—OH), a methoxy group (—OCH3), an alkoxy group
having 1-20 carbon atoms, an alkyl group having 1-20 carbon atoms, an aryl
group having 6-20 carbon atoms, a fatty acyl group having the structure —O—
CO(CH2)nCH3, wherein n=an integer from 1 to about 20, or a fatty acyl group
having the structure —O—CO(CH2)l(CH═CH)m(CH2)nCH3, wherein l is an
integer between 1 to 3, m is an integer between 1 and about 6, and n is an integer
between 1 to about 9;
each of R2 and R3 is, independently of the other, a hydrogen (—H) group, a

30

PATENT TROLLING

chemotherapy drugs used to treat several cancers, including lymphomas,
leukemias, and cancers of the breast, uterus, and lung.102 They include
doxorubicin (Adriamycin) and daunorubicin (Daunomycin).103 Other
patents we found in this category covered a broad range of analogs to the
natural antimicrobial agent indolicidin104 and a range of C-substituted
diindolylmethane compounds; the latter are used to treat a respiratory
disease and to prevent certain cancers.105
2. Methods of treatment
Another relevant patent type covers methods of treatment—that is,
the use of a drug by a doctor, patient, or anyone else to treat a disease. For
instance, Pfizer holds a patent covering the use of its blockbuster drug
Lipitor to treat high cholesterol, as well as covering the active
hydroxyl group (—OH), a methoxy group (—OCH3) or a double bonded oxygen
moiety;
R4 is a hydrogen (—H) group, a hydroxyl group (—OH), a methoxy group
(—OCH3) or a halide;
each of Y1 and Y2 is, independently of the other, a hydrogen (—H) group; a
hydroxyl group (—OH); a methoxy group (—OCH3); or a double bonded oxygen,
sulphur, or nitrogen group;
R5-R12 are, independently, —H, —OH, a halide, —OR13, —SH, —SR13, —
NH2, —NHR13, —N(R13)2; R5-R12 can additionally independently be a saccharide;
or R9 can additionally be CH3, with the proviso that:
both of R6 and R7 or both of R5 and R8 or both of R5 and R11 or both of R6 and
12
R are involved in forming a three ring structure; wherein said three ring structure
contains three heteroatoms selected from the group consisting of O and N and the
rings of said three ring structure have 5 or 6 members; or
either of R5 and R6 is independently a mercapto-haloalkyl group; an ether
alkyl group containing an easy leaving group; an alkyl group containing an easy
leaving group or an ether alkyl group containing an aziridine, oxirane, thiirane,
oxetane or thietane ring; and
R13 is a methyl group, an alkoxy group having 1-20 carbon atoms, an alkyl
group having 1-20 carbon atoms, an aryl group having 6-20 carbon atoms, a fatty
acyl group having the structure —CO(CH2)nCH3, wherein n=an integer from 1 to
about 20, or a fatty acyl group having the structure —
CO(CH2)l(CH═CH)m(CH2)nCH3, wherein l is an integer between 1 to 3, m is an
integer between 1 and about 6, and n is an integer between 1 to about 9.
102
Giorgio Minotti et al., Anthracyclines: Molecular Advances and Pharmacologic
Developments in Antitumor Activity and Cardiotoxicity, 56 PHARMACOL. REV. 185 (2004)
103
Note that, although we did not perform a full infringement analysis, it is unlikely
that doxorubicin or daunorubicin themselves actually infringe the ‗105 patent, which
discloses a 3-ring structure not present in either of those drugs.
104
Patent No. 6,524,585, filed October 12, 1999 and assigned to the University of
California.
105
B.J. Wiatrak, Overview of current respiratory papillomatosis, 11 CURRENT OPS. IN
OTOLARYNGOLOGY, HEAD, AND NECK SURGERY 433 (2003).
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pharmaceutical ingredient of Lipitor itself.106 New uses of an already
marketed drug can also be patented, like the use of minoxidil (Rogaine) to
treat male pattern baldness, discovered years after its initial development as
a treatment for high blood pressure.107
This type of method of treatment claim could be asserted by
monetizers against the industry. For instance, consider a counterfactual
story in which the use of minoxidil in treating baldness was discovered not
by Upjohn, the drug‘s maker, but by MIT researchers, who published the
results and simultaneously applied for a patent. Doctors relying on the
study could prescribe minoxidil to treat baldness, and Upjohn could share
the study in an effort to increase sales.108 Once the patent issued, however,
use of the drug to treat baldness would infringe the patent, even though
Upjohn still held the patent on the drug itself and its original use in treating
high blood pressure. Therefore, a monetizer who bought the patent from
MIT could sue Upjohn for contributory infringement, arguing that Upjohn
was encouraging doctors and patients to infringe the patent.109
A patent like this could be a ―lottery-ticket‖ patent, if it were able to
completely block the only or most important treatment indication for a
drug.110 More frequently, the monetizer could also assert this patent against
the doctors prescribing minodixil for baldness, or even patients using it.
This type of plausible nuisance suit could quickly garner high returns, since
tens of thousands of doctors would be potential targets for demand letters,
and settlements or licensing fees in the low thousands of dollars would be
106

U.S. Pat. No. 4,681,893 (filed May 30, 1986). Claims 1–7 claim various active
pharmaceutical ingredient variants; Claim 8 claims a drug containing an active
pharmaceutical ingredient (such as Lipitor), and Claim 9 claims ―[a] method of inhibiting
cholesterol biosynthesis in a patient in need of such treatment by administering [such a
drug].‖
107
The initial patent on minoxidil, U.S. Pat. No. 3,461,461 (filed Aug. 12, 1969)
covered the compound itself and a method of using it to treat high blood pressure. Using
minoxidil to treat baldness was claimed in a later patent, U.S. Pat. No. 4,139,619 (filed
Feb. 13, 1979).
108
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that a
complete and criminal ban on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers fails
the commercial free speech inquiry and is unconstitutional).
109
Inducing infringement of a patent creates liability for infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b).
110
If a drug company is not directly advertising a new use covered by a patent, it
would likely be more challenging to win a suit for induced infringement against the drug
company itself. This lack of advertising would be quite likely if the company did not hold
the new use patent; the company would be unlikely to seek FDA approval for the new use,
and promoting unapproved uses is prohibited by the FDA. On the other side of this
dynamic, it is challenging for companies to enforce new use patents even if they do hold
them, since they do not have information about the purposes for which doctors prescribe
drugs to any individual patient.
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far less than the cost of defending against a patent suit.111 These nuisance
suits would be problematic and expensive for doctors and could create
tremendous leverage against drug companies to license the relevant patents.
While once the thought of monetizers targeting small-scale users was
considered very unlikely,112 such tactics have recently become much more
common, as described above.113
One example of such a broad method of treatment patent we found
could potentially implicate postmenopausal hormone replacement therapy
(HRT).114 Patent no. 6,692,763, filed July 11, 2000 and assigned to the
University of California system, disclosed ―methods for treatment of
postmenopausal women using ultra-low doses of estrogen.‖ The broad
independent claim covers administration of estrogen to postmenopausal
women in very low doses.115 Although HRT most frequently uses higher
dosage levels, 116 this patent could plausibly be asserted against industry and
111

This cost disparity also decreases the challenge that patent-holders—whether drug
companies or monetizers—cannot easily tell for what purpose a doctor is prescribing a
drug; successfully defending against a nuisance suit is still far more expensive than a
typical settlement or licensing fee for small targets.
112
Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation (June
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
(indicating recent increase in targeting smaller entities, as compared to the past: ―PAE
activities hurt firms of all sizes. Although many significant settlements are from large
companies, the majority of PAE suits target small and inventor-driven companies. In
addition, PAEs are increasingly targeting end users of products, include many small
businesses.‖).
113
See supra pt. I at 8.
114
Although HRT has been the subject of some controversy regarding its preventative
effects, it is still in wide use. See generally Debora Kotz, Hormone replacement therapy
supported
for
some,
Boston
Globe
(Oct.
2,
2013),
available
at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/10/01/hormone-replacement-therapy-lessrisky-for-women-their-latest-data-suggest/pqdVCCO4i4EXP4shXBODsI/story.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2013)
115
Claim 1 claims:
A method for treating a physical condition resulting from estrogen decline in
a postmenopausal subject, said method comprising administering to said subject
an amount of estrogen which is effective to produce a resulting serum level of said
estrogen in said subject that is equivalent to a serum estadiol [sic] level not
exceeding of between about 5 pg/ml and about 15 pg/ml [note – for
postmenopausal women, the level typically ranges from 0 to 35 pg/ml], wherein:
the estrogen is administered orally, parenterally, or transdermally;
said physical condition is selected from the group consisting of
osteoporosis, headaches, nausea, depression, hot flashes, decrease in
bone mineral density, and increased risk or incidence of bone fracture;
and
the resulting serum level of the estrogen is responsive to the
administering of the estrogen.
116
See Rice VM, Optimizing the Dose of Hormone Replacement Therapy, 47(5) INT‘L
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practitioner targets.
3. Manufacturing methods
In addition to central patents covering active pharmaceutical
ingredients and methods of treatment, other patents cover more peripheral
activities. For instance, patents can cover methods used to manufacture
drugs. Such a patent could block the manufacture of a drug if it covered a
central process, or could less powerfully force a firm to shift its methods,
which is itself costly.117
We found several potentially assertable patents covering
manufacturing methods. As one of us has previously noted, determining
actual infringement of manufacturing methods patents is challenging due to
the secrecy of pharmaceutical manufacturing.118 This makes assertion of
such patents less likely to successfully support a ―lottery-ticket‖ strategy.
However, that would not prevent the assertion of these patents in a
―peddler‘s bag‖ or ―assault rifle‖ strategy , especially for manufacturing
method patents which are relatively common or which form a small but
useful part of typical manufacturing procedures.
For instance, Patent no. 6,890,740, filed February 12, 2001 and
assigned to the University of California, claims a method of separating
different-sized biological materials.119 The patent broadly covers separating
J. OF FERTILITY AND WOMEN‘S MED. 205–10 (2002) (―[M]ore commonly prescribed doses‖
ranges include 0.625 mg of CEE or 0.5 mg 17beta-estradiol.).
117
See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311682,
25–31.
Although
determining potential infringement is challenging because manufacturing processes are
typically kept secret, see id. at 35–35, once an infringement suit is brought demonstrating
infringement is made somewhat easier by a statutory presumption of infringement on a
showing ―(1) that a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented
process, and (2) that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process
actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so determine.‖ Id. (citing
35 U.S.C. § 295). This presumption exists to counter the typical secrecy accorded
manufacturing methods. Id. While the initial stage of identifying potential infringement
may deter most suits by pharmaceutical companies, who have incentives to avoid bringing
frivolous or losing suits against repeat-player competitors, monetizers may lack those
incentives and are demonstrably much more willing to bring ―fishing expedition‖ suits.
118
See id. at 34–36.
119
Claim 1 claims:
A method for separating different sized biological materials to increase
throughput of sampling, comprising the following steps in the order named:
a. centrifuging said biological materials in a container;
b. inserting a separation barrier into said container to separate
biological materials with a size small enough to pass through said
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biological materials of different sizes by centrifuging the materials in a
container with a size-specific sieve so smaller materials pass through and
larger materials do not.120 Such a method is broadly useful in the
manufacture of biologics,121 and might plausibly be alleged to be infringed
in many manufacturing processes, even if the monetizer has little or no
direct knowledge.
4. Dosage forms
Patents can also cover the specific dosage form of a drug. Dosage
form describes the physical form of the drug taken by a patient—that is, a
tablet, capsule, solution, or some other format. A patent which could be
used to block a particular dosage form could provide a significant weapon
to monetizers; while it would not block all uses of a drug, it could block the
dominant format of a single drug and could also potentially impact multiple
drugs made by a single firm.
While many traditional dosage forms, such as a basic coated tablet, a
capsule, or a solution, are unlikely to be patentable, other more recent forms
may be. For example, Patent no. 7,300,668, filed October 29, 2002 and
assigned to MIT, covers a three-dimensionally printed controlled-release
dosage form.122 The patent claims a printed dosage form made up of
separation barrier from biological materials with a size too large to pass
through said separation barrier;
c. withdrawing a portion of said biological materials from only one
side of said separation barrier.
120
Claim 1 covers:
A method for separating different sized biological materials to increase
throughput of sampling, comprising the following steps in the order named:
a. centrifuging said biological materials in a container;
b. inserting a separation barrier into said container to separate
biological materials with a size small enough to pass through said
separation barrier from biological materials with a size too large to pass
through said separation barrier;
c. withdrawing a portion of said biological materials from only one
side of said separation barrier.
121
Biologics are large-molecule drugs made by living systems rather than chemical
synthesis. They include proteins, vaccines, and antibodies, and make up a large and
growing fraction of blockbuster drugs. See Jordan Paradise, Follow-On Biologics:
Implementation Challenges and Opportunities: Foreword, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 501,
502 (2011).
122
Claim 1 covers:
A dosage form comprising:
a three-dimensionally printed innermost region comprising a first
regional concentration of at least one Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient;
and
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multiple layers, each layer with a different concentration of the active
ingredient. Without the three-dimensional printing limitation, that format
describes many current extended-release dosage forms, and a broad
construction of the term ―three-dimensionally printed‖ is at least plausible.
5. Screening methods
Patents can also cover the processes that companies use to find new
drugs, particularly ways to screen large sets of possible drugs to find the
ones which are likely to be medically useful. We found several such
patents in our search. While monetizers asserting these patents are less
likely able to exploit the leverage provided by regulatory hurdles described
above,123 it may still challenge significant research and development
activity by drug companies. Such patents would be particularly amenable
to ―peddler‘s bag‖ or ―assault rifle‖ approaches.
One example is Patent no. 6,274,321, filed December 3, 1999 and
assigned to the University of California system, covering a very general
method of screening nucleic acids (including DNA, cDNA, and RNA) to
find which nucleic acids express products of medical interest.124 Such
plural three-dimensionally printed non-innermost regions in nested
arrangement and comprising:
a) one or more nested internal regions each comprising a
respective regional concentration of at least one Active
Pharmaceutical Ingredient, wherein an internal region
completely surrounds and is in contact with the innermost
regions, and any other internal region present completely
surrounds another internal region located to the interior thereof;
and
b) an outermost region completely surrounding an internal
region and comprising a respective regional concentration of at
least one Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient,
wherein the internal and outermost regions are in nested
arrangement, the regional concentration of Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredient in a region is different from the regional concentration of
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient in another region adjacent to it, the
regional concentration of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient in an internal
region is non-zero, the regional concentration of Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredient in plural regions is non-zero, and the respective regional
concentrations are selected so that the at least one Active Pharmaceutical
Ingredient is released in approximately a zero-order release.
123
See supra at 22.
124
Claim 1 of the patent claims:
A method of identifying a nucleic acid in a pool of interest, comprising the
steps of:
(1) obtaining a plurality of nucleic acids, wherein the nucleic acids
are individually identifiable;
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screening is a basic research step in many forms of pharmaceutical research,
especially in developing new biologics.125 Thus, such a patent could
potentially be asserted against the research activities of many different
firms.
6. Plausibly related patents
Finally, among the significant number of patents we found in the
preceding categories which appear to have at least the possibility of
meritorious assertion, we found many patents which would at least pass the
risibility test—at least potentially enforced by the possibility of Rule 11
sanctions for frivolous suits—and which could therefore be useful to add
bulk to a ―peddler‘s bag‖ approach or in any approach relying primarily on
the high costs of patent litigation to extract relatively small settlements. For
instance, we found patents on isotopically labeled DNA,126 a method for
treatment of retinal diseases,127 fluorescent protein sensors for detection of
analytes,128 combinatorial synthesis of inorganic composite materials,129 and
catalytic reactions involving alkenes.130 While it is possible that any of
these might more accurately be placed in one of the prior categories, they
did not appear to our initial examination as likely to form the basis for a
stronger patent suit. However, each could potentially be used as part of a
broader set of asserted patents to increase potential litigation costs and
(2) pooling the nucleic acids in step (1) into at least two pools of at
least one nucleic acid each;
(3) expressing the nucleic acid pools in step (2) to obtain
corresponding protein expression product pools;
(4) assaying the expression product pools in step (3) for products
having an interaction with a target molecule;
(5) selecting a nucleic acid pool corresponding to an expression
product pool identified in step (4); and
(6) identifying at least one individual nucleic acid in the nucleic acid
pool identified in step (5).
125
Paul H. Johnson, et al., Mutliplex Gene Expression Analysis for High-Throughput
Drug Discovery: Screening and Analysis of Compounds Affecting Genes Overexpressed in
Cancer Cells, 1 MOLECULAR CANCER THERAPEUTICS 1293 (2002).
126
U.S. Pat. No. 7,022,834 (filed September 16, 2004) (assigned to The Regents of the
University of California).
127
U.S. Pat. No. 6,066,675 (filed September 8, 1997) (assigned to The Regents of the
University of California).
128
U.S. Pat. No. 6,197,928 (filed March 14, 1997) (assigned to The Regents of the
University of California).
129
U.S. Pat. No. 7,767,627 (April 22, 1997) (assigned to The Regents of the University
of California).
130
U.S. Pat. No. 8,314,246 (filed August 30, 2006) (assigned to Massachusetts
Institute of Technology).
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consequently provide additional leverage in settlement negotiations.
7. Overall search conclusions
Our search confirmed our initial suspicions that university patent
holdings are likely to provide fertile hunting grounds for monetizers. In a
relatively short period of time, two researchers with only basic expertise
were able to find dozens of potentially monetizable patents within the
holdings of just five major universities. Undoubtedly the holdings of those
universities include many more patents potentially assertable against
players in the biopharmaceutical industry. And, of course, those are only
five universities—there are many more schools with extensive holdings
potentially available.
The ease with which we found potentially relevant patents inevitably
raises the question: if these patents are around and threatening, why hasn‘t
the biopharmaceutical industry found and dealt with them? One possibility,
of course, is that the industry has found most or all commercially relevant
patents, and that such patents have been evaluated by the relevant potential
targets and either found unproblematic or licensed. Given the lack of
discussion of ancillary patents or monetizers in the pharmaceutical industry
generally, and the challenges of conducting a comprehensive search as
opposed to our quick look, we think this outcome unlikely. It seems more
likely that the conventional wisdom above—few relevant patents, a limited
set of monetizer targets, and higher barriers to commercial entry—has
helped to keep these potential patent threats off the radar of the industry.
A second possibility is simply that up until now, the patent holdings
of major universities has posed little threat, particularly those peripheral
patents that could be used for the type of bargaining leverage popularized in
modern patent trolling, and have thus been too remote to consider.
Universities traditionally have not engaged in widespread patent litigation.
For example, an extensive academic study of all 13,000 patent lawsuits filed
in 4 recent years showed that universities have served as the first named
plaintiff in less than one-half of one percent of the lawsuits filed.131 Given
that universities have not engaged in extensive litigation themselves, and
have had a stated policy of not transferring to patent assertion entities, the
threat of university holdings may have been to low to justify the costs of
searching out and licensing every patent that could potentially be launched
against a product. This would be particularly true, given the trolling tactics
of extracting settlements related to the economics of litigation, rather than
the value of the patent itself. Without a clear threat of that kind, the costs of
131

See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 16.
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clearing the field of anything that could be waved at a biopharmaceutical
company would be wasteful, if not prohibitive.
In short, modern patent trolling in the technology industry did not
require the invention of new inputs. The basic raw materials existed,
including broadly worded patents, a large inventory of unused patents and
patent claims, and an imbalance of litigation costs. The catalyst for modern
patent trolling in the technology industry was simply brilliant minds
calculating how to take advantage of these elements on a large-scale and
sophisticated manner, with many others following suit.
Although early anecdotal evidence suggests that patent trolling is
moving into biopharmaceuticals, conventional wisdom has always held that
the raw materials do not exist in that space. This study, however,
demonstrates that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Where behavior is
structurally predictable, opportunities exist to allow planning for and
protecting against abuses in that behavior.
CONCLUSION
In the ongoing policy and scholarly debates about patent trolls, by
far the most prominent focus has been on the software and high technology
industries. Conventional wisdom has assumed that the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries have little to fear from trolls, and at least partly
because of that assumption, those industries have either opposed or skirted
many reform efforts in both the past and present.
In this piece, we have argued that, on both theoretical and empirical
levels, patent monetizers are able and likely to spread beyond their
traditional targets and that the bio and pharmaceutical industries are
vulnerable to monetization tactics. Theoretically, the newly diverse
strategies of monetizers broaden potential targets, and in the drug industry,
regulatory constraints may make patent holdups particularly costly.
Empirically, our deliberately brief and cursory survey of university patent
holdings reveals that many patents are potentially available for licensing to
monetizers, and universities are becoming more amenable to such
licensing.132 More broadly, potentially assertable patents are likely to be
found not only in the holdings of universities, but in the portfolios of
biotech and pharmaceutical companies, large and small, which may well be
willing to license patents to the detriment of their competitors as has
happened in the high tech sector. It is not inevitable that monetizers will
descend on the bio and pharmaceutical industries, but in our opinion it is a
serious threat. Potentially policy solutions to the problems raised by
132

See Basken, supra note 88.
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monetizers should take this possibility into account.

39

